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An introduction to univalent foundations for
mathematicians
DANIEL R. GRAYSON
Abstract. We offer an introduction for mathematicians to the
univalent foundations of Vladimir Voevodsky, aiming to explain
how he chose to encode mathematics in type theory and how the
encoding reveals a potentially viable foundation for all of modern
mathematics that can serve as an alternative to set theory.
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Introduction
The traditional foundation for mathematics, chosen more than a cen-
tury ago, pins down basic issues, such as what numbers “really are”,
by giving them a specific arbitrary internal structure based on sets1,
which is irrelevant to modern daily mathematical discourse. Bertrand
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1For example, one may define 3 to be either {0, 1, 2} or {2}.
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Russell’s contemporaneously proposed alternative foundation [47] was
based on the theory of “types”, in which each variable is to be accom-
panied by a type, which is drawn from a hierarchy of types of increasing
complexity and which provides the variable’s range of values, the aim
being to prevent the formulation of paradoxical concepts, such as the
set of all sets. Over the intervening decades type theory has been
developed by computer scientists into a useful tool for verifying cor-
rectness and security of computer languages and by mathematicians
into a useful tool for computer verification of mathematical theorems,
such the Four Color Theorem (the original 1976 computer-assisted [14]
Appel-Haken proof [12, 13] had gaps, but a proof was finally verified
[29] in 2005 by computer using the proof assistant Coq [51]), the Feit-
Thompson odd-order theorem [30], and the Kepler Conjecture about
sphere packing [31].
In this brief introduction, we’ll take a glance at the world of math-
ematics as viewed through the univalent foundations of Voevodsky,
which is based on type theory, is part of the world of homotopy type
theory, is formally and precisely specified, and has been under devel-
opment over the last several years. The most fundamental novelty for
mathematicians is that the notion of equation is recast using (depen-
dent) types, as originally used by de Bruijn [28] in the proof checker
Automath, and as formulated and augmented by Per Martin-Lo¨f [43],
so that an equation is no longer necessarily a proposition. Building on
that, harking back to a conjecture of Grothendieck about∞-groupoids,
Voevodsky singles out the types with h-level (at most) n, for a natural
number n, with the “true propositions” being the types at h-level 0,
with the “propositions” being the types at h-level (at most) 1, with
the “sets” being the types at h-level (at most) 2, with the objects of
a category being the elements of a type at h-level 3 that captures the
groupoid of isomorphisms of the category, and so on. (The quota-
tion marks in the previous sentence are intended to indicate initially
that these “propositions” and “sets” are intended to play the role that
propositions and sets play in set theory, but are not the same: rather,
they are alternative ways to formalize a common intuitive understand-
ing of the terms2.) Thus propositions and their proofs become part
of the language of mathematics, rather than part of the language of
2Perhaps one would prefer to use three terms, when needed to avoid ambiguity:
set for the intuitive notion, Zermelo-Fraenkel structure for the set theory notion (as
Voevodsky preferred to call it), and h-set for the univalent foundations notion.
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logic3, and sets become a special case of something more fundamental,
types, worthy of independent study.
The formal mathematical language, together with the Univalence
Axiom, fulfills the mathematicians’ dream: a language for mathemat-
ics invariant under “equivalence” and thus freed from irrelevant details
and able to merge the results of mathematicians taking different but
equivalent approaches. Voevodsky called this invariance property of
the language “univalence”4. It offers the hope that formalization and
verification of today’s mathematical knowledge may be achievable, re-
lieving referees of mathematics articles of the tedious chore of checking
the details of proofs for correctness, allowing them to focus on impor-
tance, originality, and clarity of exposition. Feasibility and practicality
of the approach were demonstrated by Voevodsky in his Foundations
[58, 64], based on Coq, and various teams have continued formalization
efforts based on it. In section 5 we describe how the notions of group
and torsor are encoded in the system, thereby motivating the defini-
tions of proposition and set and aiming to expose the aspects of the
system that make the formalization succeed.
Further useful expositions of the subject include these: [27, 57, 48],
and some philosophical background is provided in [54, 55, 56, 53].
I turn now to a bit of speculation. The beauty of mathematics, as
appreciated by human mathematicians, is enhanced by formalization,
for a beautiful proof known to be correct is more beautiful than the
same proof in unverified form. Even if formalization becomes widely
used, it will still be humans who decide what to prove, how to prove
it, which proofs are better than others, and which proofs are worth
publishing in journals. A beautiful incomplete or incorrect proof can
benefit from formalization, too – then anyone will know precisely what
has been done, that it has been done correctly, and what remains to
be done.
3A simple way to embed logic into set theory is to associate to a proposition P
the set {x ∈ {0} | P}. Under this embedding the true propositions are associated
with one-element sets, propositions are associated with sets with at most one ele-
ment, and the logical operations may be re-implemented as set theoretic operations.
Something similar happens in univalent foundations.
4Voevodsky explained his choice of the term “univalent” in [62]: it comes from
a Russian translation of the Boardman and Vogt book “Homotopy Invariant Al-
gebraic Structures on Topological Spaces”, where the term “faithful functor” is
translated as “univalent functor”. He also said “Indeed these foundations seem to
be faithful to the way in which I think about mathematical objects in my head.”
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The adoption of proof formalization by a broad segment of practicing
mathematicians will await the day when mathematicians feel more suc-
cessful with formalization than without, as happened with TeX starting
in the 1980’s. There is much development to be done to make proof
assistants more powerful and easier to use. Formalization of a result
also depends on formalization of the results cited by it, so another
prerequisite for wide adoption is the formalization of a large body of
existing mathematics.
Current proof assistants are oriented toward enabling humans to en-
ter proofs efficiently, so perceiving the beauty of a proof by reading its
formalization will not be as enlightening as by reading human-written
prose about it, except for those who become proficient with the proof-
entering mechanism. Eventually, when proof-entering technology is
sufficiently developed, we can expect proof-reading technology to be
developed further, and, ultimately, the optimal way to read a proof
and to learn it will be with the active assistance of a proof assistant,
so that details can be clarified upon demand, right down to the bot-
tom. Anyone who has worked their way through even a fragment of
EGA, with its numerous cross-references to earlier results, knows how
desirable that is in a text, and how hard it is to achieve outside a uni-
fied framework. In an automated comprehensive system, it would be
effortless.
Alexander Beilinson has written [18], perhaps expressing a thought
of I. M. Gelfand: “Modern mathematics is a unique thrust of concep-
tual thought: once the right concept (a mathematical structure) and a
language to deal with it are found, a whole new world unfolds.” This is
what has happened with univalent foundations, and in this new world
mathematicians and the beauty of mathematics will prosper.
Dedication
I dedicate this article to Vladimir Voevodsky, an ingenious mathe-
matician with an immense drive to create, who died suddenly in Sep-
tember, 2017, at the age of 51. Our friendship began perhaps in 1994,
when I first became aware of his work on motivic cohomology, and he
visited me in Urbana to explain what it was about. Some mathemati-
cians had suspected that there was a larger role for homotopy theory
to play in motivic cohomology, but it was up to Vladimir to show the
way, which he did with immense energy, and a detailed plan for the
future covering many components of his program. His work, including
a proof of the Milnor Conjecture (1970), won him the Fields Medal in
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2002, went most of the way toward the ultimate solution of the Bloch-
Kato Conjecture (of which the Milnor Conjecture is a special case), the
Beilinson-Lichtenbaum Conjecture, and the conjecture of Milnor about
the Witt ring of quadratic forms. The field of motivic homotopy theory
remains a vibrant one to this day, although Vladimir stopped partici-
pating in it about ten years ago or so. He started thinking about the
use of computers for formal representation and verification of mathe-
matical statements and proof in 2002. We worked together for a week
in Spring, 2004, brainstorming about that, dreaming about what an
ideal system would be like, and I even wrote some code. I soon became
occupied with other matters, but he surveyed the field, and by 2006
had chosen type theory as the proper language. By 2010 he had chosen
a suitable encoding of mathematics in type theory (described in this
article) and had spent three months writing some brilliant, beautiful,
and instructive proofs in Coq, which he dubbed Foundations [58], later
incorporated into a broader project with more authors called UniMath
[72]. Always eager to participate in his project, I finally found the time
to start collaborating with him in 2011, and in 2012-2013 I attended
the special year on the topic at the Institute for Advanced Study and
found it bracing and enlightening. His final project was to establish
the soundness of the univalent foundations with complete mathemati-
cal rigor in a series of papers, eight of which he managed to write (see
section 7). His dream to establish the univalent foundations as the
preferred and practical framework for formalizing the world’s mathe-
matical knowledge seems feasible, but much work remains to be done by
the community. A fitting memorial for Vladimir would be to formalize
his work on motivic homotopy theory in the univalent foundations.
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1. What is a type?
In some computer programming languages, all variables are intro-
duced along with a declaration of the type of thing they will refer
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to. For example, one may encounter types such as bool, string, int,
and real, describing Boolean values, character strings, 32 bit integers,
and 64 bit floating point numbers. The types are used to determine
which statements of the programming language are grammatically well-
formed. For example, if s of type string and x is of type real, we may
write 1/x, but we may not write 1/s.
Types occur in traditional mathematics, as expressed in informal
mathematical speech, and are used in the same way: all variables are
introduced along with a declaration of the type of thing they will refer
to. For example, one may say “consider a group G”, “consider a ring
R”, or “consider an algebraic variety X over a field k”. One does not
see circumlocutions such as “consider a thing X : if X is a group then
. . . ”.
This informal use of types is not supported by first-order logic and
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, where there are just two types of mathe-
matical or logical objects: propositions and sets. Nevertheless, as with
computer languages, here the types are used to determine which state-
ments of the theory are grammatically well-formed. For example, if X
and Y are sets, then we may write the proposition X ∈ Y , and if P
and Q are propositions we may write the proposition P ∧ Q, but we
may not write P ∈ Q or X ∧ Y .
In type theory, there are many more types, they support the tradi-
tional use of types in informal mathematical speech, and they are used
for everything. There will be enough primitive ways to form new types
from old ones to provide everything we need to formalize mathemat-
ics, including: logical quantifiers, functions, families, pairs, products,
sums, and equality. Building on that, one may introduce types such
as N, Z, Q, Group, Ring, and AbelianCategory, whose elements are,
respectively, the natural numbers, the integers, the rational numbers,
the groups, the rings, and the abelian categories.
One expresses the statement that an “element” a is of “type” X by
writing a : X . Using that notation, each variable is introduced along
with a declaration of the type of thing it will refer to, and the declared
types of the variables are used to determine which statements of the
theory are grammatically well-formed. Propositions and sets are to be
re-implemented as types with a certain property, and we will have no
use for the set membership operator ∈.
As we have said, if X and Y are types, there will be a type whose
elements serve as functions from X to Y ; the notation for it is X → Y .
This allows us to introduce the surprising mathematical pun f : X →
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Y , which says that f is an element of the type X → Y , and which can
be read traditionally as saying that f is a function from X to Y .5
Functions behave as one would expect, and one can make new ones
in the usual way.6
In the following sections we will expose various other elementary
sorts of types, focusing most on those with novel aspects.
2. The type of natural numbers
The inductive definition of the natural numbers provided by Giuseppe
Peano in 1889 [45] is mirrored almost exactly in type theory.
Here are Peano’s rules7 for constructing the natural numbers in the
form that is used in type theory.
P1: there is a type called N (whose elements will be called natural
numbers);
P2: there is an element of N called 0;
P3: if m is a natural number, then there is also a natural number
S(m), called the successor of m;
P4: given a family of types X(m) depending on a parameter m of
type N, in order to define a family f(m) : X(m) of elements of
each of them it suffices to provide an element a of X(0) and to
provide, for each m, a function gm : X(m) → X(S(m)). (The
resulting function f may be regarded as having been defined
inductively by the two declarations f(0) := a and f(S(m)) :=
gm(f(m)).)
5This new interpretation of the notation may appear jarring to those who are
accustomed to writing something like “consider a function X
f
−→ Y ”, regarding the
arrow as a pictorial representation of the function itself; we won’t do that.
6 To provide an example of making new functions in the usual way, consider
functions f : X → Y and g : Y → Z. We define their composite g ◦ f : X → Z by
setting g ◦ f := (a 7→ g(f(a))). Such definitions are to be regarded as syntactically
transparent in our formal system, in the sense that two formal expressions will be
regarded as being the same by definition if they yield the same formal expression
after the definitions of all the symbols within them are completely expanded. Given
two expressions that are the same by definition, we may replace one with the other
in any other expression, at will. Here is an example: consider functions f : X → Y ,
g : Y → Z, and h : Z → W . Then (h ◦ g) ◦ f and h ◦ (g ◦ f) are the same by
definition, since applying the definitions within expands both to a 7→ h(g(f(a))).
One may define the identity function idX : X → X by setting idX := (a 7→ a).
Application of definitions shows that f ◦ idX is the same as a 7→ f(a), which, by
a standard convention, is to be regarded as the same as f . A similar computation
applies to idY ◦ f .
7There is a reason for not calling them Peano’s Axioms in this context, since we
wish to reserve the word “axiom” for decrees that a proposition has a proof.
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Mathematicians will recognize rule P4 as “the principle of mathemat-
ical induction” when each X(m) is a proposition, and as “defining a
function by recursion” if each X(m) is a fixed set Y . We will refer to
it simply as “induction for N”.8
Notice that the two cases in an inductive definition correspond to
the two ways of introducing elements of N via the use of rules P2 and
P3. Intuitively, the induction principle for N amounts to saying that
the element 0 and the function S “generate” the type N, in the same
way that a set may generate the corresponding free group.
We introduce the following definitions.
1 := S(0)
2 := S(1)
3 := S(2)
4 := S(3)
We may use induction to define the sum m+ n of two natural num-
bers, as a natural number. We handle the two possible cases for
the argument m as follows: we define 0 + n := n, and we define
(S(m)) + n := S(m + n). Application of definitions shows, for ex-
ample, that 2 + 2 and 4 are the same by definition, because they both
reduce to S(S(S(S(0)))).9
Before we can write an equation such as 2+2 = 4, we must introduce
a formal treatment of equality in type theory. We do that in the next
section.
8Here is an example of defining a function by recursion using induction for N.
We define the factorial function f : N → N by setting f(0) := 1 and setting
f(S(m)) := (m + 1) · f(m). One can infer that the function gm of rule (P4) is
n 7→ (m+ 1) · n.
9The reduction of the expression 2 + 2 to S(S(S(S(0)))) by applying the defini-
tions involved can be regarded as a computation, which is “complete”. Computation
succeeds in other cases involving natural numbers, too. That is why we don’t refer
to Peano’s rules as axioms, as we mentioned in a previous footnote, for we wish
to reserve the word “axiom” for statements unaccompanied by effective methods
for computation. A good example of such an axiom is the law of the excluded
middle, which states, in our context, that any proposition P either has a proof or
its negation has a proof. The law provides no effective way to decide which case
we are in nor what the proof would be in that case. Nevertheless, it is consistent
with type theory and all the axioms we intend to use, so its use as a hypothesis in
a theorem is permissible. If one wishes to define a discontinuous function of a real
variable, it is needed, because there is no effective way to decide whether a real
number x is, for example, positive – even a very long computation may yield a very
accurate rational approximation to x that is too close to 0 to determine whether x
is positive.
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3. Identity types
The most important type is the identity type, which implements the
intuitive notion of equality, but in a novel way; the mathematical reader
will be more comfortable if we call it the equality type, at least initially.
Its novelty derives from three aspects: equality between two elements
may be considered only when the two elements are of the same type;
equality may fail to be a proposition (unless it’s an equality between
two elements of a set); and a proof of equality between two sets will
amount to a bijection between them.
We can anticipate the consequences of the first of those three aspects
immediately. For example, let 2Z denote the integer corresponding to 2
and let 2Q denote the rational number corresponding to 2. Then there
is no way to translate the valid but mathematically irrelevant equation
2Z = 2Q of set theory into type theory, because 2Z and 2Q are elements
of distinct types: Z and Q. Beginning mathematics students would
be completely comfortable with this restriction. For another example,
consider two sets (or types) X and Y . There is no way to state a
condition that says that X is a subset (or subtype) of Y . Instead, as
in category theory, one considers embeddings of X into Y .
Observe that the smallest reflexive relation on the elements of a setX
is equality. Per Martin-Lo¨f realized in the 1970’s that one can use this
observation to provide an inductive definition of equality10 analogous
to the inductive definition of the natural numbers presented in section
2.
Here are Martin-Lo¨f’s rules for constructing equality types.
E1: for any type X and for any elements a and b of it, there is a
type a = b;11
E2: for any type X and for any element a of it, there is an ele-
ment refl(a) of type a = a (the name refl comes from the word
“reflexivity”)
E3: for any type X and for any element a of it, given a family of
types P (b, e) depending on parameters b of type X and e of
type a = b, in order to define elements f(b, e) : P (b, e) of all of
10See [42, section 1.7]. An antecedent was published in [41, section 3.8.2, p. 190].
11 We point out the order of quantifiers in rule E1 is grammatically required.
Suppose one tried to rephrase rule E1 to have the form “for any elements a and
b, . . . ”. Then the puzzle would be how to formulate the condition that a and b
have the same type, and there is no way to do that in our formal language, as
currently designed. An arbitrary element of an arbitrary type is always introduced
by introducing a quantifier first for its type, so the quantifier for the element can
state the type of the element, as required.
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them it suffices to provide an element p of P (a, refl(a)). The
resulting function f may be regarded as having been completely
defined by the single definition f(a, refl(a)) := p.
An element of a = b can be thought of, for now, as a proof that a is
equal to b.
We see from rule E2 that refl(S(S(S(S(0))))) serves as a proof of
2 + 2 = 4, as do refl(4) and refl(2 + 2). A beginning student might
wish for a more detailed proof of that equation, but as a result of
our convention above that definitions are syntactically transparent, the
application of definitions, including inductive definitions, is regarded as
a trivial operation.
We will refer to rule E3 as “induction for equality”. It says that to
prove something about (or to construct something from) every proof
that a is equal to something else, it suffices to consider the special case
where the proof is the trivial proof that a is equal to itself, i.e., where
the proof is refl(a) : a = a. Notice that the single case in such an induc-
tion corresponds to the single way of introducing elements of equality
types via rule E2, and compare that with P4, which dealt with the two
ways of introducing elements of N. Intuitively, the induction principle
for equality amounts to saying that the element refl(a) “generates” the
system of types a = b, as b ranges over elements of A.
The mathematical reader who accepts Peano’s rules as valid may
feel uneasy about the validity of Martin-Lo¨f’s rules for equality types.
Peano’s rules are easily accepted as valid, because they describe things
we know about, natural numbers, and they posit inference rules which
appear to be valid. Proofs of equality, on the other hand, are not things
we know about, at least, not as mathematical objects in their own
right. The informal way to justify them is to repeat that the smallest
reflexive relation on the elements of a set X is equality, so everything
true about equality ought to flow from reflexivity. Formally, one way to
proceed is to justify the consistency of the formal system by providing
an interpretation of the entire formal system in a suitable mathematical
structure. The justification of type theory with the univalence axiom in
that way one of the goals of a project of Voevodsky; we cite references
in section 7.
For now, until we encounter univalence and its consequences, the
reader may consider the following hints pointing toward an interpreta-
tion (in classical mathematics) of this formal system. In that interpre-
tation, every type X is interpreted as a set |X|, and an element a : X
is interpreted as an element |a| ∈ |X|. A function type X → Y is
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interpreted as the set of functions from |X| to |Y |. The type N is inter-
preted as the set |N| of natural numbers. The type a = b is interpreted
as the one-point set {∗} if |a| = |b|, and is interpreted as the empty
set {} if |a| 6= |b|. The element refl(a) : a = a is interpreted as the ele-
ment ∗ of the one-point set. Using this visualization may provide some
temporary intuition for Martin-Lo¨f’s rules. The interpretation is not
required to be faithful, except in the sense that the empty type (to be
introduced below) should be interpreted as the empty set. Then if the
formal system allowed an absurdity to be proved, the corresponding
element a of the empty type would give an element |a| of the empty
set, providing a contradiction in set theory.
Later, when univalence is introduced, the mathematical interpreta-
tion will have to be modified so types are interpreted not as sets, but
as topological spaces, to handle the behavior of types that are not sets.
We may use induction to prove symmetry of equality. In accordance
with our discussion of implication above, we show how to produce an
element of b = a from an element e of a = b, for any b and e. By
induction (letting P (b, e) be b = a in rule E3 above), it suffices to
produce an element of a = a; we choose refl(a) to achieve that.
Transitivity of equality is established the same way. For each a, b, c :
X and for each p : a = b and for each q : b = c we want to produce
an element of type a = c. By induction on q we are reduced to the
case where c is b and q is refl(b), and we are to produce an element of
a = b. The element p serves the purpose. Notice the similarity of this
inductive definition with the definition given above of the sum m+ n.
Associativity of transitivity is established the same way. We leave
its proof as an exercise.
Now let’s consider how we might formulate our symmetry result.
One way would be to assert that we have proved the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. For any type X and for any a, b : X, (a = b)→ (b = a).
Aside from using → instead of =⇒ for the “implication”, it looks
traditional, but there is a drawback that is perhaps not immediately
apparent: standard practice in current mathematical prose is to regard
the statement of a lemma as sufficient for application of the lemma, and
to regard the proof (once it has been provided and verified) as irrelevant
for the application of the lemma12. In this case, the construction of the
symmetry function that we have provided above is not revealed in the
statement of the lemma, but only in the proof of the lemma. Having
12I don’t mean to imply that the proof is useless for the mathematical reader,
who may learn something from it, or who may modify it to prove something else.
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the precise function available for perusal might be important if b = a
has more than one proof. Thus a better formulation would be as a
definition, as follows.
Definition 3.2. For any type X and for any a, b : X , let symma,b :
(a = b) → (b = a) be the function defined by induction by setting
symma,a(refl(a)) := refl(a).
Similarly, transitivity is best formulated as an inductive definition
transa,b,c : (a = b) → ((b = c) → (a = c)). We may abbreviate
(transa,b,c(p))(q) as p ∗ q.
Given 4 points a, b, c, d : X and 3 proofs p : a = b, q : b = c, r : c = d
of equality, we may produce two proofs that a = d, namely (p ∗ q) ∗ r
and p ∗ (q ∗ r). Because they are elements of the same type, we may
consider the type (p ∗ q) ∗ r = p ∗ (q ∗ r). An element of it is a proof of
associativity, and it may be constructed by induction.
One frequent use of equality proofs is in substitution. Let X be a
type, and let P (x) be a family of types depending on a parameter
x : X . Suppose a, b : X and e : a = b. Then there is a function of type
P (a) → P (b). To prove that, it suffices, by induction, to consider the
case where b is a and e is refl(a) and to provide a function P (a)→ P (a).
To achieve that, we provide the identity function.
In the case where each P (a) is a proposition (to be defined later),
we may say that the truth of P (a) is invariant under substitution. In
other words, equal elements of X have the same properties. In the
case where each P (a) is not assumed to be a proposition, and thus its
elements are ways to add extra structure to a, we may say that the
structures can be transported from a to b by the proof e of equality.
4. Other types
There are other examples of types that are conveniently presented
as inductive definitions, in the style we have seen with the natural
numbers and the equality types. We present three examples.
Firstly, there will be the “empty” type, called ∅, defined inductively,
with no way to construct elements provided in the inductive definition.
The inductive principle for ∅ says that to prove something about (or to
construct something from) every element of ∅, it suffices to consider no
special cases (!). Hence, every statement about an arbitrary element of
∅ can be proven. As an example, we may prove that any two elements
x and y of ∅ are equal by using induction on x.
An element of ∅ will be called an absurdity, and the negation ¬P of
a proposition P will be implemented as the function type P → ∅. This
An introduction to univalent foundations for mathematicians 13
is sensible, because an element of ¬P could be applied to an element
of P to produce an element of ∅, i.e., an absurdity.
Another appropriate name for ∅ is False.
We may also construct a function False → X , for any type X , by
induction, showing that from an absurdity anything follows.
To encode the property that X has no elements we use the type
X → ∅. To encode the property that elements a, b : X are not equal,
we use the type (a = b)→ ∅, and we let a 6= b denote it.
Secondly, there will also be a type called True, defined inductively
and provided with a single element triv ; (the name triv comes from the
word “trivial”). Its induction principle states that, in order to prove
something about (or to construct something from) every element of
True, it suffices to consider the special case where the element is triv .
As an example, we may prove, for any element u : True, that u = triv ,
by using induction to reduce to proving triv = triv , a proof of which
is provided by refl(triv). One may also prove that any two elements of
True are equal by using induction twice.
There is a function X → True, for any type X , namely: a 7→ triv .
This corresponds, for propositions, to the statement that an implication
holds if the conclusion is true.
The name of True is appropriate, because if P is a proposition,
a function of type True → P could be applied to the element triv ,
yielding an element of P , thus proving P .
Thirdly, there will be a type called Bool , defined by induction and
provided with two elements, yes and no. One may prove by induction
that any element of Bool is equal to yes or to no.
We may use substitution to prove yes 6= no. To do this, we introduce
a family of types P (b) parametrized by a variable b : Bool . Define
P (yes) := True and define P (no) := False. The definition of P (b) is
motivated by the expectation that we will be able to prove that P (b)
and b = yes are equivalent. If there were an element e : yes = no, we
could substitute no for yes in triv : P (yes) to get an element of P (no),
which is absurd. Since e was arbitrary, we have defined a function
(yes = no)→ ∅, establishing the claim.
In the same way, we may use substitution to prove that successors of
natural numbers are never equal to 0, i.e., for any n : N that 0 6= S(n).
To do this, we introduce a family of types P (i) parametrized by a
variable i : N. Define P recursively by specifying that P (0) := True
and P (S(m)) := False. The definition of P (i) is motivated by the
expectation that we will be able to prove that P (i) and i = 0 are
equivalent. If there were an element e : 0 = S(n), we could substitute
S(n) for 0 in triv : P (0) to get an element of P (S(n)), which is absurd.
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Since e was arbitrary, we have defined a function (0 = S(n)) → ∅,
establishing the claim.
Type theory provides sums of types. By this we mean if X is a
type and Y (x) is a family of types indexed by a parameter x of type
X , then there will be a type
∑
x:X Y (x) whose elements are the pairs
(a, b), where a : X and b : Y (a). This is reminiscent of the sum in set
theory, which is implemented by the disjoint union ∐x:XY (x). Sums
may be implemented by an inductive definition, and they behave as
one would expect.13
Using sums we may encode the fibers of a function. Given a function
f : X → Y and an element y : Y , the fiber (or inverse image) f−1(y)
consists of points x such that f(x) = y. This is encoded by defining
f−1(y) :=
∑
x:X(f(x) = y). In other words, a point of the fiber is a pair
(x, e) consisting of the point x and a proof e of the equation f(x) = y.
There is a binary sum operation on types: for any types X and Y ,
there is a type X ∐ Y , which is analogous to the disjoint union of
two sets. From an element of X or an element of Y we can produce an
element of X∐Y . The binary sum can be implemented as a sum where
the index type is Bool and the family of types sends yes to X and sends
no to Y , or it may be implemented as an inductive definition. Binary
sums behave as one would expect.
Our type theory will also contain products of types. By this we mean
if X is a type and Y (x) is a family of types indexed by a parameter x
of type X , then there will be a type
∏
x:X Y (x) whose elements serve as
families of elements b : Y (a), one for each a : X . A family is much like
a function, but without a single codomain. This is reminiscent of the
product in set theory, which uses the same notation. Products behave
as one would expect.14
There is a binary product operation on types: for any types X and
Y , there is a type X × Y . From an element of X and an element of Y
we can produce an element (x, y) of X×Y . The binary product can be
implemented as an inductive definition, as a special case of products,
or as a special case of sums. Binary products behave as one would
expect.
13. . . except perhaps when X is a type that is not a set, because then the type
X behaves like a topological space, the family Y (x) behaves like a family of spaces
varying continuously in the parameter x, and the sum behaves like the total space
of the family.
14. . . except perhaps when X is a type that is not a set, because then the product
behaves like the space of continuous sections of the family.
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5. Formalization of mathematics
With equality types available, with all their expected properties, we
may encode some elementary mathematical properties as types, to show
how such encoding goes in practice, as implemented (approximately)
in: the UniMath project [72], which is exposed by Voevodsky in [64]; as
in the HoTT project [4], which is exposed in [17]; as in the HoTT-Agda
project [1]; and as in the Lean theorem prover [2].
Let X be a type. The property that X has at most one element
is equivalent to the property that any two elements are equal, so is
encoded by
∏
a:X
∏
b:X(a = b). The property that X has exactly one
element is equivalent to having an element such that every other ele-
ment is equal to it; hence it is encoded by
∑
a:X
∏
b:X(a = b).
Now let us consider how to formalize the mathematical notion of
group. More precisely, we adopt as our goal the definition of a type,
Group, whose elements are the groups, whose existence was advertised
in the introduction.
Following a traditional approach, one may choose to define a group as
a tuple (G, e, i,m), whereG is a set, e is the unit element, i is the inverse
operation, and m is the multiplication operation; one also asserts the
truth of various properties of the operations, such as associativity.
Using sums, we may define a 4-tuple (G, e, i,m) as an iterated pair
of the form (G, (e, (i,m))), and we may consider defining Group to be
the type of such 4-tuples.
Well, almost: we need to specify a type whose elements will pro-
vide the candidates for G, as the notion of sum requires. For that
purpose, we introduce a universe, U0; its elements will correspond to
“small” types. The notion of “universe” seems to have first arisen in
the formalization of set theory by Bernays [19], building on work of von
Neumann, in which there are three types of thing: propositions, sets,
and classes. One of the classes has all of the sets as its elements, and it
is analogous to our U0. One could extend their system by introducing
hyperclasses, one of which would have all of the classes as its elements,
and we could regard it as analogous to a bigger universe U1, one of
whose elements is U0. And so on. Indeed, such a chain of universes
U0, U1, U2, . . . is postulated in our type theory, and the concept turns
out to be of fundamental importance. Each one is a “universe” in the
sense that it is closed under the operations of type theory that make
new types from old ones.15
15The interpretation in classical mathematics that we discussed above for veri-
fying consistency of our formal system will need to be adjusted to provide interpre-
tations of the universes. For that purpose one assumes that there is an ascending
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Having introduced universes, we may say that our tuples (G, e, i,m)
will be the elements of type
∑
G:Un
∑
e:G
∑
i:G→G(G × G → G). Here
n is a fixed universe level, and we are engaged in specifying a type to
encode the groups that live in Un.
In order to formalize the assertion that the operations satisfy various
properties, we recall that all such propositions are to be re-implemented
as types and their proofs are to be re-implemented as elements of those
types. So we extend our 4-tuple to a 9-tuple (G, e, i,m, α, λ, ρ, λ′, ρ′),
where α is a proof of associativity, λ is a proof of the left unit law, ρ is
a proof of the right unit law, λ′ is a proof of the left inverse law, and
ρ′ is a proof of the right inverse law.
Well, almost. The associativity property is formulated in set theory
as
∀a∈G∀b∈G∀c∈Gm(m(a, b), c) = m(a,m(b, c)),
so we need a type that can represent universal quantifiers. The product
type will serve that purpose, so we can use
∏
a:G
∏
b:G
∏
c:G
m(m(a, b), c) = m(a,m(b, c)).
We will take α to be an element of that type; in other words, it will
be a function that provides, for each a, b, c a proof of the equation
m(m(a, b), c) = m(a,m(b, c)). The other four properties are imple-
mented in a similar way.
Now consider the possibility that we have two unequal proofs, α and
α′, of associativity. Then we would get two unequal groups,
(G, e, i,m, α, λ, ρ, λ′, ρ′)
and
(G, e, i,m, α′, λ, ρ, λ′, ρ′),
and that would be an unintended departure from traditional mathe-
matics. This is a consequence of the necessity to include the proofs of
the properties in the tuple, because we are trying to define the type
whose elements are the groups in our formal language, which provides
no way to assert the properties of a group “on the side”. Thus we are
led to insist that there is a proof of α = α′, as a consequence of which
it would follow that our two groups are equal. Each of the functions α
and α′ assigns to any a, b, c : G a proof of m(m(a, b), c) = m(a,m(b, c)),
and functions with unequal values can’t be equal, so we will need to
be able to prove that any two proofs of m(m(a, b), c) = m(a,m(b, c))
are equal. For this purpose it would be most convenient if it were true
chain of Grothendieck universes |U0| ∈ |U1| ∈ |U2| ∈ · · · , and one trusts that that
assumption doesn’t add an inconsistency to set theory.
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more generally that any two proofs of an equation x = y between any
two elements x and y of G are equal.
Thus we are led to embark on a diversion about types for which
any two elements are equal. In informal mathematical speech and
in set theory, any proof of a proposition is irrelevant, as it tells us
only that the proposition is true: it provides no information that is
needed later on. Good mathematical prose is formulated to follow that
practice by relocating information needed later on from the proof to the
statement being proven. That and the preceding paragraph motivate
our definition of “proposition” in this context. A proposition is a type
such that any two elements of it are equal. The statement that a type
P is a proposition is encoded by the type isProp(P ) :=
∏
a:P
∏
b:P (a =
b).16
Statements proven previously can be rephrased as saying that False
and True are propositions.
Suppose P andQ are propositions. The implication P =⇒ Q can be
implemented as the type P → Q. An element of it will transform any
proof of P into a proof of Q. The conjunction P∧Q can be implemented
as the product P ×Q. We may define the universal quantifier
∀x:XP (x) :=
∏
x:X
P (x)
for a family of propositions P (x) depending on a parameter x : X .
It is a proposition, and it has the properties one would expect. By
contrast, the disjunction P ∨ Q cannot be implemented as the binary
sum P ∐Q, because that type will have two elements if both P and Q
have proofs. We will return to this issue later. A similar remark applies
to an arbitrary sum of propositions: it cannot be used to implement
the existential quantifier.
We continue our diversion with a discussion of types X with the
property that any two proofs of an equation a = b between any two
elements a and b of X are equal, motivated by our need for G to be
such a type, as we said above. With our definition of proposition in
hand, we can rephrase the condition on X as positing that the equality
type a = b between any two elements a, b : X is a proposition. A type
X with that property is defined by Voevodsky to be a “set”. Let us
use the notation isSet(X) to denote the type encoding this condition.
It can be proven that the propositions are the sets with at most one
element, that many types, including Bool and N, are sets, and that
16For the purpose of exposition, we have chosen a definition that differs from
Voevodsky’s and is simpler, but equivalent to it.
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many operations for making new types from old preserve the property
of being a set.
Ending our diversion and returning to our formalization of the notion
of “group”, we see that we need G to be a set. Since we can’t postulate
that G is a set “on the side”, we have to add a proof of it to the tuple.
Thus our final definition of “group” is that it is a 10-tuple
(G, e, i,m, α, λ, ρ, λ′, ρ′, ι),
where ι is a proof that G is a set, i.e., it is an element of the type
isSet(G).
Now consider the possibility that we have two unequal proofs, ι and
ι′, that G is a set. Then we would get two unequal groups,
(G, e, i,m, α, λ, ρ, λ′, ρ′, ι)
and
(G, e, i,m, α, λ, ρ, λ′, ρ′, ι′),
and that would be an unintended departure from traditional mathe-
matics. If we were able to prove that ι = ι′, then our two groups would
be equal. Luckily, it is a theorem of Voevodsky that, for any type
X , the type isSet(X) is a proposition.17 Applied to G, it shows that
ι = ι′, implying in turn that our two groups are equal. This fortuitous
foundational result helps to show the feasibility of the approach.
We now define Group to be the type consisting of such 10-tuples; its
elements are the groups living in Un. For precision about the universe,
one may use a subscript, as in Groupn.
It should now be evident to the reader how to follow the pattern
established above and formalize the definitions of the types of many
sorts of mathematical objects, such as of Abelian groups, monoids,
rings, commutative rings, and fields. For example, the type Setn of all
sets in Un will consist of the pairs (X, ι), where X is an element Un,
and ι is a proof that X is a set. As above, one sees that two proofs
that X is a set yield equal elements of Setn.
Now let’s consider the problem of formalizing the notion of G-torsor.
By definition, it is a nonempty set X with a free transitive18 left action
17His proof depends on two axioms, both of which are consequences of the Uni-
valence Axiom to be presented later. One of them is a strong form of function
extensionality, which states that functions having equal values are equal.
18One says that G acts freely on X if gx = x implies g = e. One says that G
acts transitively on X if, for all x, y ∈ X , there is some g ∈ G such that gx = y.
Thus G acts freely and transitively on X if, for every x ∈ X , the function of type
G → X given by g 7→ gx is a bijection. The conjunction of these two conditions
is equivalent to the map G × X → X × X provided by (g, x) 7→ (gx, x) being a
bijection, which is why these two conditions are usually stated together.
An introduction to univalent foundations for mathematicians 19
by G. For example, if G is a subgroup of a group H , then the cosets
of G in H are G-torsors. We may represent a G-torsor as a tuple
(X,m, α, λ, ι, τ, ν),
where m : G × X → X is the action, and the remaining components
represent the associativity property, the left unit property, the proof
that X is a set, the proof that G acts freely and transitively on X , and
the proof that X is nonempty19.
Well, almost: what type does the proof ν of nonemptiness of X
belong to? The only type available for the task seems to be X itself:
suppose we were to use it. Let ν and ν ′ be unequal elements of X .
Then we would get two unequal G-torsors,
(X,m, α, λ, ι, τ, ν)
and
(X,m, α, λ, ι, τ, ν ′),
and that would be a departure from traditional mathematics: two
proofs of nonemptiness of the set underlying a torsor should not give
two different torsors. Moreover, equipping a torsor with a point ren-
ders the torsor canonically trivial. In set theory there is a difference
between a pointed set and a nonempty set, and we need a formal way
to express that difference in type theory.
In order to ensure that two proofs of nonemptiness (such as ν and
ν ′) are always equal, we need them to be elements of a proposition, to
be called ‖X‖, say, and to be called the propositional truncation of X .
Any element of X should provide a proof of nonemptiness, so there
should be a map µ : X → ‖X‖. One way to implement propositional
truncation is to add it to the language and justify it later, as is done
in [16], or one could provide the following economical definition of it,
as is done in [72].
For any type X in Un, Voevodsky defines
‖X‖ :=
∏
P :Un
(isProp(P )→ ((X → P )→ P )).
It is the conjunction of all the propositions “implied” by X , and thus
it is a proposition. The map µ can be implemented as x 7→ P 7→ i 7→
f 7→ f(x). Moreover, it has a universal property: any map g : X → Q
to a proposition Q in Un factors through µ; the factorization map is
19Nonemptiness of X does not follow from the other properties.
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provided by w 7→ ((w(P ))(j))(g), where j is the proof that Q is a
proposition.20
Returning to our formalization above of the type of all G-torsors, we
may now specify that the final component ν of the tuple is to be of
type ‖X‖, thereby completing the formalization.
Similarly, we may use propositional truncation to define the disjunc-
tion of two propositions as P ∨Q := ‖P ∐Q‖. It is a proposition and
has the properties one would expect.
We may use propositional truncation to define the existential quan-
tifier
∃x:XP (x) := ‖
∑
x:X
P (x)‖
for a family of propositions P (x) depending on a parameter x : X . It
expresses the statement that there is some element x so that P (x) is
true, without providing x. It is a proposition and has the properties
one would expect.
Surjectivity of a function f : X → Y may be encoded by the type
∀y:Y ‖f
−1(y)‖. The type
∏
y:Y f
−1(y) would not provide a suitable en-
coding, since it is the type of sections of f .
6. Univalence
At this point, we are faced with a design decision: whether to ar-
range for some of our identity types a = b to have multiple elements.
Additional equalities would be useful, because they can be used in sub-
stitutions. Alternatively, if classical mathematics were our only guide,
we would be led to introduce an axiom that asserts that every type is
a set. That wouldn’t lead to a contradiction, but it wouldn’t be essen-
tial, because the classical constructions of new sets that don’t involve
Grothendieck universes, when formalized in type theory, yield types
that can be proved to be sets anyway, as Voevodsky has shown.
Let us consider the identity types X = Y corresponding to types X
and Y in the same universe, Un say. The only obvious statement about
such types is that X = X has an explicit and trivial proof: refl(X).
20The definition is quantified over a variable P in the universe Un, so ‖X‖ lies
not in Un, as desired, but in Un+1. Moreover, one wants to be able to apply the
universal property to propositions Q living in higher universes. To address these
problems, Voevodsky’s proposed system includes various “resizing” rules [59], one of
which ensures that propositions descend to lower universes. He believes it likely that
the resizing axioms are consistent with the rest of the system, but the simplicial
set interpretation described below does not validate them. Settling this issue is
important.
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We motivate a desire for further proofs of equality between types as
follows.
In set theory, the equation N = {x ∈ Z | x ≥ 0} is false, if one
uses the usual definition that Z is a certain quotient set of N×N. The
statement is false because the elements of the two sets are different.
The strongest thing that can be said is that there is an isomorphism
N ≃ {x ∈ Z | x ≥ 0}. Nevertheless, a mathematician may identify the
two sets and expect not to get into trouble.
In set theory, the associativity (X∐Y )∐Z = X∐ (Y ∐Z) of binary
sums is false, if one uses the usual definition that X ∐ Y is the set
of pairs (i, z) where i = 0 or i = 1, z ∈ X if i = 0, and z ∈ Y if
i = 1. The statement is false because the elements of the two sets
are different. The strongest thing that can be said is that there is a
natural isomorphism (X ∐ Y ) ∐ Z ≃ X ∐ (Y ∐ Z). Nevertheless, a
mathematician may identify the two sets and expect not to get into
trouble.
In type theory we may entertain the possibility that N and {x ∈ Z |
x ≥ 0} are equal, and that binary sums are associative, because the
argument above, about the elements of one set not being equal to the
elements of the other, is not available. We may even try to re-engineer
our formal system to make those equalities happen.
Here’s how Voevodsky made it happen.
A function f : X → Y between two types is called an equivalence if,
for each y : Y , the fiber f−1(y) has exactly one element. Voevodsky
has proven that being an equivalence is a proposition.21 The inter-
ested reader may encode this property as a type by applying encodings
previously introduced. Thus the equivalences are the elements of a
type, which is denoted by X ≃ Y . This definition has almost all of
the properties one would expect for the appropriate notion of isomor-
phism between two types. For example, one can prove that the identity
function X → X is an equivalence, that an equivalence has an inverse
function that is also an equivalence, and that a function with an inverse
function is an equivalence.
For types X, Y : Un, we may define a function ΦX,Y : (X = Y ) →
(X ≃ Y ) by induction: in the case where Y is X , it sends refl(X) to
the identity equivalence. This gives a relationship between equalities
and equivalences.
Voevodsky’s Univalence Axiom is stated as follows.
21The proof depends on two axioms that are consequences of the Univalence
Axiom below.
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Axiom 6.1 (Univalence). The map ΦX,Y : (X = Y )→ (X ≃ Y ) is an
equivalence.
This axiom provides a way to promote equivalences into equalities,
by application of the inverse of ΦX,Y , thereby satisfying the desires
motivated above.22
Now we address an issue of terminology. From this point on, the
reader may prefer to think of an element of X = Y not as providing
a proof that the types X and Y are equal, but as providing a way
to identify X with Y . Different elements will provide different ways.
This alternative reading may relieve some discomfort for readers who
prefer to preserve the word “equality” for something that can happen
in just one way. In line with that consideration, we will refer to the
type X = Y as an identity type, rather than as an equality type, and
we will refer to its elements as identities or identifications.
For example, a bijection θ : N ≃ {x ∈ Z | x ≥ 0} provides, via
univalence, a proof θ′ that N = {x ∈ Z | x ≥ 0}, which in turn allows
us to use θ′ to identify N with {x ∈ Z | x ≥ 0}. This way of putting
it is common mathematical practice. What’s new is support for the
practice in the language of logic.
Let us pause to infer an important foundational consequence. We
know that the statements of type theory are invariant under identity
(by substitution). With the ability to promote equivalences to iden-
tities, we see that the statements of type theory are invariant under
equivalence, thereby fulfilling the mathematicians’ dream: one cannot
express a property in our formal language that fails to be invariant
under equivalence. That invariance is a strong and useful principle,
which flows from the precise way that the formal language has been
restricted to the minimum required for formalization of mathematics.
Pairs of sets often have more than one isomorphism between them.
Hence, in the presence of the univalence axiom, pairs of types often will
have more than one proof of identity, and thus the universes containing
those types are not sets. Moreover, in the absence of univalence and
of axioms contradicting it, the universes cannot be proved to be sets.
This is a major difference from set theory.
A consequence of the Univalence Axiom is that isomorphism between
groups is the same thing as identity. In other words, given two groups
22The statement of the Univalence Axiom is (encoded by a type that is) a propo-
sition, because being an equivalence is a proposition. Mart´ın Escardo´ has pointed
out that the proof can easily be made independent of any axioms, because, while
proving equality of any two elements of the type asserting univalence, one has avail-
able all the consequences of univalence. It’s desirable for statements of axioms to
be propositions, so asserting the axioms doesn’t lead to indeterminate behavior.
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G,H : Group, let G ∼= H denote the type of isomorphisms between G
and H . Then the natural map G = H → G ∼= H is an equivalence. An
analogous statement can be proved for all the other standard mathe-
matical structures: partially ordered set, G-torsor, monoid, ring, etc.
This general principle is called the structure identity principle in the
book [57, section 9.8]. The main point in the proof of it is that the
notion of isomorphism between two instances of an algebraic struc-
ture pays attention to every element of the structure, so the elements
of either structure are uniquely determined by the equivalence on the
underlying types and the elements of the other structure. As a conse-
quence, we see that Group is not a set.
The structure identity principle can be used to prove, for example,
that if X and Y are partially ordered sets, x is a minimal element of X ,
and f : X ≃ Y is an isomorphism of partially ordered sets, then f(x) is
a minimal element of Y . The same proof works for maximal elements:
neither proof needs to appeal to the definition of “minimal element”
or “maximal element”, because the principle applies to all properties
expressible in our formal language. By contrast, in set theory, to prove
those assertions, the definitions of minimal element and of maximal el-
ement must be examined and used, since the more permissive language
of set theory permits statements to be written that contain mathemati-
cal irrelevancies; for an example, consider the proposition x = 2, which
does not imply f(x) = 2.
Traditionally, the objects of a category have constituted a set, but the
natural way to formalize the category of groups is with its objects being
the elements of the type Group. The best categories are the ones (such
as this one) where the identities in the type of objects are equivalent
to the isomorphisms, for it is such categories that fulfill the category
theorists’ dream: to work in a mathematical language where one cannot
express a property that fails to be invariant under isomorphism23; such
categories are called univalent. See [5] for a procedure that renders
categories univalent in a universal way.
On the other hand, sometimes one needs a category whose objects
form a set; for example, one may wish to construct the geometric re-
alization of the category as a topological space. If so, then one may
incorporate enough extraneous data in each object of the category to
make proofs of identity between two objects unique. For example,
23For example, Makkai [40] has formulated the dream this way, as a requirement
to be satisfied by a future “Structuralist Foundation of Abstract Mathematics”
(SFAM): “SFAM adopts isomorphism of objects in a category ... to play the role of
equality for those objects, in the sense that ... all grammatically correct properties
of objects of a fixed category are to be invariant under isomorphism.”
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one may equip each object in the category of finite dimensional vector
spaces with an ordered basis – that is enough, because isomorphisms
respecting the bases are unique.
As we said above, in the presence of univalence the type Group is
not a set, but there is something positive to be said about it. Given
two groups G,H : Group, the type G = H is a set, because the map
G = H → G ∼= H is an equivalence of it with a set.
This motivates another fundamental definition of Voevodsky’s, which
unifies and simplifies the formalization of the basic theorems of the
subject. We define by induction on a natural number n what it means
to say that a type X has h-level (at most) n: (1) it has h-level 0 if
it has exactly one element; (2) it has h-level n + 1 if for any elements
a and b of X , the type a = b has h-level n. Voevodsky has proven
that the types of h-level 1 are the propositions24, and then one can
see from the definition that the types of h-level 2 are the sets. We see
also that Group is of h-level 3, which is the natural level for the type
of objects of any groupoid. Properly defined, the type of categories
will be of h-level 4, because the groupoid of categories is a 2-groupoid:
an equivalence between two categories may have automorphisms. In
general one expects the objects of an n-groupoid to be of h-level n+2.
Voevodsky points out a stratification of all of mathematics into lev-
els that follows from the stratification of types by h-level: element-level
mathematics concerns equations between elements of sets, or proper-
ties of elements of sets; set-level mathematics concerns isomorphisms
between algebraic structures, or properties of algebraic structures in-
variant under isomorphism; groupoid-levelmathematics concerns equiv-
alences of groupoids, or properties of groupoids invariant under equiv-
alence of groupoids; and so on [64].
Another common mathematical practice is to speak of “natural” or
“canonical” constructions; for example, one often states that there is no
natural isomorphism between a vector space V and its dual vector space
V ∗. This practice is also directly supported now by logic, provided
we consider naturality only with respect to isomorphisms V ∼= V ′,
which, by the structure identity principle, are captured by identities,
which in turn may be used in substitutions. We may formalize the
type of isomorphisms between a vector space and its dual as the type∏
V :V ect(V
∼= V ∗), where V ect is the type of vector spaces over a field k
24Actually, he defined a proposition to be a type of h-level 1; our definition differs
slightly.
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in universe Un. In the presence of univalence, one may prove that the
type of such families of isomorphisms is empty.25
7. The interpretation
The possibility that an identity type a = b has multiple elements
presents a problem for the mathematical reader who wants to under-
stand the situation, as well as a problem for the reader who has perused
the interpretation for our formal system in classical mathematics that
we sketched above. That interpretation is incompatible with the Uni-
valence Axiom, because, roughly speaking, for a set X : Un with more
than one element it interprets the map ΦX,X : (X = X)→ (X ≃ X) as
a function from the one point set to the set of permutations of |X|; the
function sends the single point ∗ to the identity bijection. The func-
tion is not a bijection, as would be required to interpret the Univalence
Axiom.
The idea for repairing this is to interpret each type X as a topological
space26 |X|, to interpret an element a : X as a point |a| of the space
|X|, to interpret a proof of a = b as a path connecting |a| to |b| in
|X|, and to interpret the type a = b as the space of all such paths.
Symmetry of identity passes to reversal of paths in the interpretation,
and transitivity of identity passes to concatenation of paths. A family
Y (x) of types parametrized by a variable x : X will be interpreted by
a fibration27 E(Y )→ |X| whose fibers over the points |a| ∈ |X| arising
from elements a : X are the spaces |Y (a)|. Induction for identity will
be interpreted by the lifting property that characterizes fibrations, as
observed in [15]. One assumes one is given an ascending sequence of
Grothendieck universes V0 ∈ V1 ∈ . . . and one interprets the universe
Un by the space |Un| of all spaces in Vn; it is a space in Vn+1. For n ≥ 0,
types of h-level n+2 are interpreted by spaces whose homotopy groups
vanish above dimension n. Validity of the Univalence Axiom in this
interpretation is a theorem of Voevodsky [36], which builds on a 2006
construction of A. Bousfield to show that the path lifting map from
the space of paths between two points of |Un| to the space of homotopy
equivalences between the corresponding fibers of the universal space
over |Un| is a homotopy equivalence. The expository paper [34] gives
the main ideas of the construction of the interpretation; full details
25Compare with the discussion in [44] or the use of the word “natural” in the
proof of [57, Theorem 3.2.2].
26The topological spaces used in the interpretation are actually fibrant simplicial
sets.
27In topology, a “continuous” family of topological spaces is one that is provided
by the fibers of a continuous map that is a fibration.
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of the correctness of the interpretation, and thus of the soundness of
the theory, will appear in a series of papers planned by Voevodsky,
aimed at treating a large class of formal languages, some of which are
available: [69, 61, 60, 66, 65, 63, 67, 68, 71, 70]. What necessitates so
many details to be expressed in print is the abundance of grammatical
rules in a formal language such as this one, each one of which has
an incarnation in the interpretation that must be carefully considered,
along with the way they interact with each other.
The Law of Excluded Middle and the Axiom of Choice are also val-
idated by this interpretation, so classical mathematics is supported
soundly by the univalent foundations.
8. Further developments
In addition to the focus of many on establishing the soundness of
the system and on paving the way for widespread adoption of univa-
lent foundations and the use of proof assistants by mathematicians,
there are other interesting developments focusing such things as com-
putability and the study of types in their own right.
The phrase “synthetic homotopy theory” refers to the enterprise
where one regards a type as a good substitute for the classical no-
tion of topological space, and one regards a proof of identity as a good
substitute for the notion of a path between two points of a space: the
goal is to see which theorems of homotopy theory have analogues that
remain provable in this context. This context is a primitive one, be-
cause so few axioms are assumed to set up the theory, as we have seen,
so the theorems that hold in this context will the most fundamental
ones, capable of the most generalization. An amazing surprise is that
so many theorems of homotopy theory hold in this rarefied context.
Given a type X we define the type π0X of connected components as
the quotient of X by the equivalence relation b = c, where b and c are
elements of X . Voevodsky has proven that π0X is a set (as is the case
for the type of equivalence classes of any equivalence relation on X).
Given a type X and a basepoint a : X , we define the loop space ΩX
to be the type a = a, and we equip it with the basepoint refl(a) : ΩX .
Iterating n times yields a type ΩnX , and we may define πnX := π0Ω
nX .
The proofs of transitivity and symmetry in section 3 provide π1X with
a group structure, and thus provide πnX with n group structures when
n > 0. A basic fact of homotopy theory is that the group πnX is abelian
for n ≥ 2, and that the various group structures are the same. To prove
that, it suffices to show that the two composition operations on the
type Ω2X (coming from transitivity) agree and are commutative. (We
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don’t have to say “commutative up to homotopy” here, because in our
context, homotopy and identity are the same.) One standard argument,
due to Eckmann and Hilton, involves showing that a monoid object
in the category of monoids is commutative and the two operations
coincide. That argument is formal enough that it applies here [57,
Theorem 2.1.6] and gives the first indication that something wonderful
is going on. The interested reader may refer to [57, Chapter 8] or to
[50] for more leisurely expositions of this pursuit.
It is not yet known how to construct types that correspond to the
spheres Sn in the univalent foundations as formalized by Voevodsky
(except for S1, which can be defined as the type BZ of Z-torsors). The
book [57] introduces spheres by adding further basic type constructors
to the formal language – they are called “higher inductive types”. For
example, the circle S1 is defined inductively by declaring that there is
a basepoint s : S1 and that there is a loop ℓ : s = s. The higher spheres
are done in a similar way. Voevodsky’s program for proving soundness
of univalent foundations doesn’t include higher inductive types, but
others are pursuing it: see [39]. Much of the work cited below uses
higher inductive types.
In [38] one may find a proof that the fundamental group of S1 is Z,
and in [32] one may find a formalization of the Seifert–van Kampen
theorem. In [33] one may find a formalization of the Blakers-Massey
connectedness theorem, using higher inductive types to construct ho-
motopy pushouts. A translation of the formal proof into classical ho-
motopy theory was given in [46], with the expectation that it would
go through for any ∞-topos. Finally, the proof was (manually) trans-
lated into the language of ∞-topoi in the paper [6], yielding a new
theorem.28 Even better would be a meta-theorem that says that type
theory serves as an internal language for higher topoi, so manually
rewriting and rechecking the proof in the new context would not be
required. Some progress on that dream has recently been made in the
papers [35, 37].
A type-theoretic proof that π4(S
3) ∼= Z/2 is offered by the thesis
[21] and the paper [22]. The first part of the proof demonstrates the
existence of a natural number n satisfying π4(S
3) ∼= Z/n, and the sec-
ond part demonstrates that n = 2. The proofs are constructive, in the
sense that the use of axioms (such as the Law of Excluded Middle or
the Axiom of Choice) is avoided, aside from the use of the Univalence
28The companion paper [7] translates the proof into the language of Goodwillie’s
calculus of functors (using a different “modality”) and yields a new result in that
context, which has various known results as corollaries.
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Axiom. Although normally the use of any axiom interferes with com-
putability, Voevodsky conjectured (albeit for a system not including
higher inductive types) that the interference arising from the use of
the Univalence Axiom can be bypassed. Thus one may hope to de-
sign a proof assistant that can produce the value of n by performing a
computation. Fundamental progress has been made in that direction
through the development of “cubical type theory” [20, 26, 52] and of
a proof assistant, cubicaltt [25], based on it. See also the continuing
development of RedPRL [3], described in the papers [10, 9, 11, 24],
and see also [8]. A formal expression for the number n has been sub-
mitted to cubicaltt for evaluation, but the computation ran out of
memory after running for 6 hours on a machine with plenty of memory,
according to Brunerie. Work in that direction continues.
In [49] one may find a type theoretic proof of the Brouwer fixed
point theorem, accomplished by an enhanced type theory called real-
cohesive homotopy type theory, which supports synthetic topology side
by side with synthetic homotopy theory. In [23] is a synthetic proof of
the theorem that cellular cohomology computes ordinary cohomology
of CW-complexes, under the assumption that the CW-complexes are
finite.
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